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tempt as a crime in the ordinary sense-a public wrong punishable by
fine or imprisonment. The court said that serious contempt was entitled
to the constitutional guaranty of a jury trial, whereas a non-serious con-
tempt would not necessarily be entitled to a jury trial. Whether or not
the criminal contempt was serious would be determined by the severity of
the punishment inflicted by the offended court. Although Bloom's offense
appears to have been indirect criminal contempt, the court specifically
discussed disorders committed in the courtroom (direct criminal con-
tempts). It stated, however, that since they were petty offenses there
would be no problem with the right to jury trial. Thus, the Supreme
Court defines a direct criminal contempt as a crime in the ordinary sense,
entitled to trial by jury if it is not a petty offense.
In the instant case the Third District Court correctly decided that
the defendant was not entitled to trial by jury within the guidelines set
out by Bloom. The court, bound by the mandate of Bloom, said that
there would be no jury trial because the offense was not sufficiently
serious but ignored the definition which was prerequisite to determining
that a jury trial was not warranted, the definition that direct criminal
contempt is a crime in the ordinary sense. Had the court applied this rule
of law, it is not unreasonable to assume that it would have applied the
criminal statute of limitations.32 Since Pendergast and Bloom are appli-
cable to the states, it is submitted that the statute of limitations" must
be applied to both indirect and direct criminal contempt if there is to be
equal protection under the Florida laws.
JOSEPH TEICHMAN
DOG OWNER'S LIABILITY IN NON-BITE SITUATIONS:
DUTY v. CAUSE-BARKING UP THE WRONG TREE
Defendant's male German shepherd was loose in the defendant's
backyard for the purpose of stud service to another defendant's female
shepherd. The backyard was enclosed by a four-foot-high chain link
fence which was parallel with and adjacent to the sidewalk upon which
the plaintiff's twelve-year-old son and two friends were walking. The
dogs charged the fence and barked, frightening the children as they
passed and causing them to run into the street where plaintiff's son was
fatally injured by an oncoming automobile. The circuit court granted
the dog owner's motion for summary judgment. On appeal to the Court
of Appeal for the Third District, held, reversed: A jury should be per-
mitted to determine whether, under the specific facts of this case, the
32. FLA. STAT. § 932.05 (1967).
33. Id.
CASES NOTED
damage to the decedent was "done by" the dogs. Brandeis v. Fletcher,
211 So.2d 606 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
Common law strict liability1 for dangerous animals was based upon
trespass.2 Strict liability was then expanded in May v. Burdett3 to cover
other injuries. Today, the owner of an animal is strictly liable only for
the consequences that result from the extraordinary risk he has created
by keeping the animal.4 Determination of whether a risk is extraordinary
1. Liability without fault is imposed upon a defendant who engages in some types of
conduct which create:
such risks of harm to others, even when the conduct is careful, that, though the
creation of the risks is not itself unreasonable because of the social utility of the
conduct, nevertheless it is unreasonable for the person injured to bear his own loss.
We may state the rules of strict liability, then, in answer to the parts of the
following general questions: (1) what types of conduct lawful in themselves are so
hazardous (2) to certain classes of persons (3) that the actor must assume some
risks of the consequences to those persons?
Harper, Liability Without Fault, 30 MICH. L. REv. 1001, 1006 (1932) [hereinafter cited as
Harper].
It has also been said that the defendant must have breached a duty to use care for
the plaintiff before the latter can bring an action in negligence.
It is enough here to say, that defendant may have a duty cast upon him by virtue
of a statute, a contract, a status or relation, such as master and servant, or by long
declared policy of the law as in the case of the keeping of wild animals. But aside
from such duties thus definitely fixed in the law, it is ordinarily said with reference
to negligence cases that when a defendant should foresee harm to the plaintiff as a
"probable consequence" of defendant's conduct, there arises the duty to take care,
and a failure to exercise such care, if resulting in harm to plaintiff, is actionable
negligence.
Green, Are Negligence and "Proximate" Cause Determined by the Same Test? -Texas Deci-
sions Analyzed, 1 TExAs L. Rav. 243, 256 (1923). [Hereinafter cited as Green, Texas
Decisions].
Thus, in this instance strict liability could be the imposition of a duty by the "long
declared policy of law" without the necessity of the foreseeability test. However, in the
instant case, the imposition of a duty would be "by virtue of a statute."
On the other hand, use of the "duty" concept in connection with strict liability has
been criticized.
[T]he duty concept is of value only where defendant is morally culpable, because
duty is primarily a moral concept. It is so shot through with moral connotations
that it actually misdescribes the character of the defendant's conduct in cases where
there is no moral fault ...
Thus the duty concept is inappropriate to characterize the strict liability cases.
With the duty notion must go the possibility of a practical application of either
Dean Green's or Professor Bohlor's technique for stating the law. If defendant has
indulged in extra-hazardous conduct at all, he has engaged in conduct which may be
the basis for legal liability. It is awkward to say that he has indulged in conduct
which is the basis for liability to some persons for some general classes of injuries
but not to other persons for other types of harms, It is much more intelligible to
state that the defendant has engaged in a type of conduct which is a sufficient basis
of liability, and then determine what consequences of such conduct he is liable for.
Harper at 1013-15.
According to this technique the defendant is liable for consequences (1) which are
of the general class of harms which make his conduct negligent, (2) if the person
injured is of the general class of persons who are threatened by the defendant's
abstract negligence, and (3) if the harm is brought about in a way as is not unjust
to hold defendant liable therefor.
Id. at 1003.
2. De Terimino Michaelis, 12 Henrici 7 Keilway 1, 72 Eng. Rep. 153 (1688).
3. 9 Q.B. 101, 115 Eng. Rep. 1213 (1846).
4. W. PRossa, TuE LAW or TORTS 513 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as PaOSSER).
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depends upon the type of animal and its social utility. "A distinction has
been made between animals which, by reason of their species, are by na-
ture ferocious, mischievous or intractable, and those of a species normally
harmless."' It has been stated that animals belonging within the first
category of species could never be regarded as safe, no matter how
domesticated they are.7 Therefore, common law strict liability within
this category of species would not depend upon scienter,8 as is the case
with the second category of speciesY Likewise, there is no scienter re-
quirement when a statute imposes liability upon the owner of an animal
for harm done thereby.'
0
In 1881, the Florida legislature enacted section 767.01 of the Florida
Statutes, which provides that "Owners of dogs shall be liable for any
damage done by their dogs to sheep or other domestic animals or live-
stock, or to persons." This statute has been interpreted to make the
owner of a dog an insurer for the acts of his dog without the requirement
of scienter," and has also been held to relate to injuries inflicted by dogs
"other than by biting."'"
In all prior Florida cases 13 where liability under the statute has
5. Id. at 513-15.
6. Id. at 514. In the first category are included wolves, Hays v. Miller, 150 Ala. 621,
43 So. 818 (1907); bears, Crunk v. Glover, 167 Neb. 816, 95 N.W.2d 135 (1959); lions,
Stamp v. Eighty-Sixth St. Amusement Co., 95 Misc. 599, 159 N.Y.S. 683 (Sup. Ct. 1916);
elephants, Filburn v. People's Palace & Aquarium Co., 25 Q.B. 258, 59 L.J.Q.B. 471 (1890);
and monkeys, May v Burdett, 9 Q.B. 101, 115 Eng. Rep. 1213 (1846). The second category
includes cattle, sheep, dogs and cats. See PROSSER at 514 nn. 77-82.
7. Filburn v. People's Palace & Aquarium Co., 25 Q.B. 258, 59 L.J.Q.B. 471 (1890).
8. Id.
9. In this category, terae domitae, defendant's strict liability is limited to the particular
risk (propensity) known to him, or which should have been known to him. Mann v. Stanley,
141 Cal. App. 2d 438, 296 P.2d 921 (3d Dist. 1956); Durham v. Barnes, 124 So.2d 792
(La. 2d Cir. 1960); Maxwell v. Fraze, 233 S.W.2d 262 (Kan. City Ct. App. 1961); Olson
v. Pederson, 206 Minn. 415, 288 N.W. 856 (1939). For liability to attach, the injury must
have been caused by that particular propensity known to the defendant. Candler v. Smith,
50 Ga. App. 667, 179 S.E. 395 (1935); Netusil v. Novak, 120 Neb. 751, 235 N.W. 335
(1931); Note, Absolute Liability of Owner of Vicious Dog for Injury Caused by Fright,
13 NEB. L. BULL. 422 (1935). Thus, notice that a dog has once bitten a man would be
sufficient to establish the scienter that he may do it again. Zarek v. Fredericks, 138 F.2d 689
(3d Cir. 1943).
10. "That section [Ohio Stat. § 5858] imposes an absolute liability upon the owner
of a dog, and scienter, fault, negligence or contributory negligence are not involved in a
proceeding thereunder." Dragonette v. Brandes, 135 Ohio St. 223, 224, 20 N.E.2d 367, 368
(1939); accord, Knapp v. Ball, 175 So.2d 808 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
11. Sweet v. Josephson, 173 So.2d 444 (Fla. 1965), aff'g 173 So.2d 463 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1964) ; Knapp v. Ball, 175 So.2d 808 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965). Cf. note 12 infra.
12. Defendant's motion for summary judgment against appellant injured by dog "other
than by biting" was granted at trial. The court held that FLA. STAT. § 767.04 (1963), which
relates specifically to dog bites, superseded and repealed FLA. STAT. § 767.01 (1963), which
relates generally to harm "done by" dogs. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed,
holding that FLA. STAT. § 767.04 (1963) superseded FLA. STAT. § 767.01 (1963) only in rela-
tion to dog bite situations. Sweet v. Josephson, 173 So.2d 444 (Fla. 1965), aff'g 173 So.2d
463 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964). See Jarvis, Torts, 1963-1965 Survey of Florida Law, 20 U. MiAm
L. REV. 820, 835 (1966).
13. Reid v. Nelson, 154 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1946); Sweet v. Josephson, 173 So.2d 444
(Fla. 1965), aff'g 173 So.2d 463 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964); Romfh v. Berman, 56 So.2d 127
CASES NOTED
been found, there has always been some form of direct contact between
the dog and the injury.14 In the instant case, the appellees argued that
"since there was no direct contact between the minor decedent and either
of the dogs, the owners are not liable for any damages resulting from
the boy's death." 5 They relied upon Schertz v. Indianapolis, Blooming-
ton and Western Railway Company, 6 wherein the court held that lia-
bility imposed by an Illinois statute 7 upon railroad corporations for
harm "done by 'agents, engines, or cars' of such corporations to cattle,
horses, or other stock"' 8 was dependent upon actual collision.
In the instant case, the court began with "the premise that liability
for non-bite damages suffered in an attack by a dog is within the con-
templation of the statute." 9 Thus it dismissed appellee's argument, stat-
ing that in Schertz "the court held that the statute contemplated only
actual collision when the statutory fence was not maintained ... ,,,)2
whereas in Florida it has already been held that non-bite damages were
within the contemplation of the statute.2' The court then went on to rea-
son that since liability as an insurer is not contingent upon a showing of
scienter or negligence of the owner,' it must depend "upon the question
of whether the boy's death is damage 'done by' the appellee's dogs, i.e.,
were the dogs the cause of the damage complained of by the plaintiffs?1
28
(Fla. 1951); Ferguson v. Gangwer, 140 Fla. 704, 192 So. 196 (1939); Knapp v. Ball, 175
So.2d 808 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965). Cf. Vandercar v. David, 96 So.2d 227 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1957);
66 A.L.R.2d 412 (1959).
14. However, there have been cases in other jurisdictions where liability has been found
without any direct contact. See Ethridge v. Nicholson, 80 Ga. App. 693, 57 S.E.2d 231
(1950); Candler v. Smith, 50 Ga. App. 667, 179 S.E. 395 (1935); Netusil v. Novak, 120
Neb. 751, 235 N.W. 335 (1931); Note, Absolute Liability oj Owner of Vicious Dog for
Injury Caused by Fright, 13 NEB. L. BULL. 422 (1935).
15. 211 So.2d at 608.
16. Illinois had enacted a statute requiring all railroad corporations to erect and main-
tain a fence along their track.
That statute provides, when the fences it requires shall be erected are not made
as therein required, or when such fences are not kept in good repair, such railroad
corporation shall be liable for all damages which may be done by the "agents,
engines or cars" of such corporations, to cattle, horses, or other stock. On the
hypothesis plaintiff's horse got on the track of defendant's road for want of such
a fence as the law requires it to erect and maintain to inclose its track and right
of way, and while on the tract the horse was frightened either by the approaching
train, or the sound of the bell or whistle, or all of them combined, and in its
flight was injured, either by jumping a cattle guard, or by coming in contact with
a wire fence, or both, that no negligence or willful misconduct can be imputed to
the agents of defendant in charge of the train at the time, and that no injury
was done to the horse by any actual collision or contact with the engine or cars
of the train, a majority of the court are of opinion the defendant is not liable.
107 Ill. 577, 579 (1883).
17. An act in relation to fencing and operating railroads, R.S. 1874, p. 807 (1874),
as amended (1879).
18. 107 Ill. at 579.
19. 211 So.2d at 607.
20. Id. at 608.
21. Sweet v. Josephson, 173 So.2d 444 (Fla. 1965), aff'g 173 So.2d 463 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1964).
22. 211 So.2d at 607; cases cited notes 12 and 13 supra.
23. 211 So.2d at 607.
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The court saw its problem as one of considering "whether the dogs'
participation in or contribution to the end result was sufficient for a jury
to consider the question of liability .... 112 Relying upon the "increas-
ingly liberal" position of the Florida courts "in allowing a jury to pass
upon questions similar to this,' 25 and upon Professor Green's statement
of proximate cause,26 the court decided in the affirmative.
It is this writer's opinion that the court in the instant case confused
proximate cause with duty.27 In determining whether the defendant is to
be held responsible for an injury to the plaintiff, the courts are faced with
two important problems.28 The first is the necessity of determining
whether the conduct was negligent.29 The second problem is the deter-
mination of whether the defendant's negligence caused plaintiff's injury.80
Quite often these two problems are hopelessly confused.8' The latter is a
24. Id.
25. Id. at 609. See Sardell v. Malanio, 202 So.2d 746 (Fla. 1967) ; Mozer v. Semenza,
177 So.2d 880 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
26. Professor Green suggests that the question is, in essence, a simple quantitative
one-whether the defendant's conduct was a material, appreciative, or substantial
factor in producing the plaintiff's injuries. If so, that is enough to enable the jury
to find causation in fact.
L. GREEN, infra note 31, in 211 So.2d at 608.
27. Negligence of a particular defendant is determined by the reasonably foreseeable
test-what the ordinary reasonable man should have foreseen as the probable consequences
of his conduct. If he should have forseen injury to the plaintiff it can be said he owes
the duty to exercise care toward the plaintiff; and failing to do so, he is guilty of negligence.
Likewise, it is said that a man shall be liable for the consequences that he as a reasonable
man should have foreseen as a result of his conduct. If such consequences were not rea-
sonably foreseeable or probable, then they were not the proximate cause of the injury.
Thus, "the 'probability,' 'foreseeability' or 'anticipation' test is seemingly used both
in determining the existence of negligence, and in determining for what consequences of such
negligence a recovery may be had. It might be more accurate to say that our courts have
apparently treated the existence of negligence and causal relation as the same problem, to be
solved by the same formula." Green, Texas Decisions at 244.
Anticipation of injury as applied in the determination of negligence and prox-
imate cause should not be confused. The former is an element of negligence, while
the latter is used to denote the relative position of cause to effect in ascertaining
whether cause is so related to effect as to bring negligence in union with the result
rendering liable a negligent actor for certain consequences.
Id. at 423, 438, citing Collins v. Pecos & N.T. Ry., 110 Tex. 577, 212 S.W. 477 (1919).
28. Green, Texas Decisions at 246.
29. Every person owes a duty to every other person to exercise care to avoid harming
him. The determination of the question as to whether the plaintiff has a right not to be
harmed and whether the defendant owes plaintiff a duty not to harm him is one of policy
to be decided by the judge.
Negligence is the failure by one defendant to exercise that degree of care needed to
avoid harming that particular plaintiff. The existence of negligence, i.e. the violation of the
duty, is a question of fact to be determined by the jury. L. GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROX-
ImA T CAUSE 11-43 (1927) [hereinafter cited as L. GREEN, RATIONALE].
30. Use of the "probable consequence" rule for the determination of the first problem
is quite legitimate. However "to attempt to make a second use of [the rule] in order to
determine [the proximate cause] issue is to pervert its use." Green, Texas Decisions at 247.
31. The primary function of the judge is to comprehend the purpose and scope of a rule
of law or the purpose and scope of a statute:
[T]he court must determine whether the hazard to which a plaintiff has been
subjected falls within the range of the protection of the rule invoked by him. But
this primary function must in no way be confused with the judge's second function
1969] CASES NOTED
question of fact to be decided by the jury, 2 while the former requires a
determination of policy by the court.83
In the instant case, the court tried to reconcile the issue of causation
with the fact that there was no direct contact. 4 This is an attempt to
define the limits of liability-a policy consideration-in terms of proxi-
mate cause.35 "The scope of the protection given by any rule must have a
boundary; the risk under which a defendant is placed must have a
limit."3" Limitations of responsibility should be based upon considera-
tions of policy and not facts of causation. 7 It is the writer's opinion that
although the court began with the correct premise-that liability for
non-bite damage was within the contemplation of the statute-it begged
the question by deciding the case on the issue of proximate cause, rather
than by making the outright policy statement that non-contact damage
suffered in an attack by a dog is within the contemplation of the statute.8
RONALD C. DRESNICK
which comes into play when a judge refuses to submit a case to the jury because
under the facts there can be only one reasonable inference drawn.
L. GREEN, RATIONALE at 69.
32. Berglund v. Hild, 135 A.52 (N.J. 1926).
33. Does the harm which plaintiff encountered fall within the limits of protection
afforded by the rule of law upon which the plaintiff is relying? L. GREEN, RATIONALE at 11-34.
34. "[Ilf the negligence element is properly solved in a case, the causal connection
problem ordinarily gives little difficulty. It is usually so clear that it does not present an
issue at all." Green, Texas Decisions, at 423, 444.
35. L. GREEN, RATIONALE at 37. But see II HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW or TORTS
1132-34 (1956) and PROSSER at 282.
36. Id.
37. See Green, Duties, Risks, Causation Doctrines, 31 TExAs L. REv. 42 (1962); cf.
Green, The Submission of Special Verdicts in Negligence Cases-A Critique of the Bug Bite
Case, 17 U. Miaci L. REv. 469. But see II HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW or TORTS 1132-34
(1956), PROSSER at 282.
38. By allowing the case to go to the jury, the court, in effect, made a policy deter-
mination as to duty.
By virtue of the fact that the judge is the dominant factor of the dual tribunal
set up for these cases, the moment a case is passed to the jury, that moment the judge
has necessarily ruled that there is a duty upon the defendant, who will be held
responsible if the jury concurs in the case as presented to them. . . . [I]f he con-
sciously holds there is a duty he will submit the case to the jury on the negligence
and other issues if there is any evidence raising them.
Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COL. L. REv. 1014, 1029-30 (1928).
